We deny the petition for writ of certiorari without prejudice to the
petitioners seeking declaratory relief in the circuit court.
Here's the hook: the 2d tier cert was a challenge to the circuit court's denial of a cert attack on the Hillsborough County Commission's approval of a plat in a non-quasi judicial proceeding.
The critical sub-issue is this: under City of Boyton Beach v. Park of Commerce, _____, the Florida Supreme Court held that the site plan decision under review was quasi-judicial in nature. The opinion included language stating broadly that all land use decision were quasi-judicial. But a footnote cited to the Snyder case, noting that the same analysis applied. Snyder, of course, involved a rezoning, and there is are statutory requirements that rezoning ordinance be adopted by ordinance (which involves a hearing). The statute involving plats, as well as the Hillsborough County land use regulations, do NOT have such an explicit provision. However, the platting statute (Chapter 177) does require the local governing board to approve a plat, and other provisions of Chapter 125 and 166 provide that the only way for local governments to act are through ordiances or resolutions, and both those statutes and the Sunshine Law require those actions to be taken at public meeetings - but not necessarily after "public hearings."
Also complicating matters is the whole bizaare history of whether and when plat approvals are ministerial; under the statute, they are if the plat meets the objective, ennumerated standards, but most local subdivision ordinance add additional requirements that may include some discretionary criteria.
Here (based on information I have that's not in the opinion), the Hillsborough County Commission approved the plat at a public hearing, but did not allow affected neighbors to introduce evidence against it. Neighbors challenged by cert under Park of Commerce, claiming violations of due process and essential requirements of law. Circuit court denied, stating that the hearing wasn't quasi-judicial in nature, and the appeal followed.
What we don't know is whether the lower court held that the plat approval wasn't quasi-judicial under the structural analysis of Bloomfield v. Mayo, which holds that you look to see whether the delegating statute or ordinance requires notice and a due process type hearing, or under the so-called functional analysis that comes from Snyder, under which the court looks to see whether the local government was applying versus making policy, and implies and requires quasi-judicial procedures if they are.
Clearly, the County did not offer the incidents of a quasi-judicial hearing, and now the courts have held that a dec action, rather than cert, was the proper remedy. The question is how broadly this holding reaches.